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- European electricity TSOs will have to achieve substantial capital expendi-
tures over the next two decades. Their current financing strategy will not be 
adapted to these unprecedented costs. Even in a ‘best-case’ scenario of full 
cooperation between the different national and regional TSOs, it will result in 
constraints on the volume of investment achievable. 
- Under current trends in the evolution of transmission tariffs, the investment 
programs that are currently planned will be unsustainable in the long-term. To 
avoid severe degradation of the TSOs financial profile, a significant increase in 
tariffs will be required. 
- Alternative financing strategies, such as issuing additional equity, or restrain-
ing dividends, could help achieving the whole-scale investment volumes at a 
lower cost for consumers. However these financing strategies cannot substi-
tute fully to an increase in tariffs. A very radical shift in the financing strategy 
would only allow a slightly higher share of the investment plans to be financed, 
at the expense of a reduced return-on-equity. Injecting capital in the transmis-
sion business would not remain attractive under such conditions. 
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1. Background: The financeability 
challenge
1.1 The need for investment in the European 
transmission grid
The European Transmission System Operators (TSOs) will 
face unprecedented capital expenditures over the next de-
cades. This need for investment has two main drivers. On 
the one hand, the development of the European electricity 
transmission grid is to play a key-role in the strategy of the 
European Union, to address challenges such as the accom-
modation of large-scale renewable sources of energy and 
market integration. On the other hand, a major share of the 
existing network is to be renewed in the coming decades 
(IEA 2011).  
The resulting volumes of investment will be challenging for 
TSOs. The ten-year plan established in 2012 by the Euro-
pean Network of Transmission System Operators for elec-
tricity (ENTSO-E) for instance mentions investments of 
€104 billion to be spent in the next ten years for projects of 
pan-European significance alone. Even with plans by Euro-
pean TSOs to raise their investments by approximately 70% 
compared to the period 2005-2009, there would still be a 
significant financing gap to be met (Roland Berger 2011). 
1.2 TSOs financing strategies: options and limits
Financeability hereby refers to the ability of TSOs to raise 
finance from capital markets in order to meet their invest-
ment program. It implies that the TSOs conserve adequate 
financial ratios, corresponding to an investment grade sta-
tus for rating agencies (See Box 1 for a description of the 
ratios we took into consideration in this study). In addition, 
the return on the regulatory asset base must be sufficient to 
cover the costs of capital of investors. 
There are three basic ways in which TSOs can finance capi-
tal expenditures: investors can raise debt, fund investment 
internally by retaining earnings, or find external sources of 
equity.
Since liberalisation, debt emission has been the option most 
commonly employed by integrated utilities in general and 
European TSOs in particular (IHS CERA 2013). As a result, 
the volume of debt has kept rising, and the leverage of Euro-
pean electricity TSOs is typically about 60-70% today, which 
limits the ability of these companies to acquire further debt 
without losing their credit rating. 
Internal equity is a major source of financing for some small 
European TSOs, but it cannot be sufficient alone at times 
when the investment needs increase significantly. Moreover, 
investors in TSOs traditionally expect a high dividend pay-
out ratio, which limits the ability of TSOs to finance invest-
ments internally. 
Raising external equity is an attractive option when the 
debt level has to be kept under a given threshold. Yet it is also 
a more expensive option. In addition to higher costs, there 
are two main obstacles to financing investments by injecting 
external equity, due to the fact that most European TSOs are 
still publicly owned3 (Roland Berger 2011). Cash-strapped 
European States are not able to inject liquidities themselves, 
and States might also be reluctant to dilute their ownership 
share of crucial assets with major public goods properties.
2. Main assumptions behind our 
calculations
2.1 Focus on a virtual integrated TSO
In order to identify constraints at the scale of the European 
transmission grid industry, we considered a best-case sce-
nario, for which full cooperation (or integration) between 
the national or regional TSOs would be achieved. We 
hence made the assumption that the different European (i.e. 
members of ENTSO-E) TSOs could be virtually aggregated 
into a single European TSO, facing the whole volume of in-
vestments. 
Note that, when relaxing this assumption, smaller TSOs fac-
ing significant investment needs and ownership-restrictions 
might be exposed to more challenging local constraints that 
would not appear in this study. 
3. Even in situations of private ownership (as in Belgium, Italy and 
Spain), public entities still hold a large minority share.
Box 1: A tailor-made quantitative approach to 
financeability
In order to assess the quality of the financial ratios of the sin-
gle TSO, we used the methodology employed by the rating 
agency Moody’s to establish the rating of companies develop-
ing regulated electric and gas networks (Moody’s 2009). 
We focused on the main quantitative metrics used by the rat-
ing agency Moody’s. Each of them account for 15% of the 
overall rating, and about 40% of the quantitative part of the 
rating. The adjusted Interest-Cover Ratio is calculated as 
Earnings before Interest and Taxes (EBIT) divided by interest 
payments: it reflects the flexibility of the regulated TSOs to 
pay interests on their debts. The Gearing level is calculated 
as the volume of debt divided by the total value of the Regu-
lated Asset Base: it represents the loan to value ratio. 
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2.2 Calculation of revenues and tariffs
In this study, the volume of investment is exogenously de-
termined and is independent from the financing strategy. 
A detailed description of the investment profiles employed 
can be found in Box 2. 
It was assumed that both operating expenditures and capi-
tal expenditures would be directly passed through to con-
sumers. Costs related to the provision of system services 
were excluded, but losses and other network-related OPEX 
were taken into consideration4. Tariffs were then determined 
as the sum of these costs and of a fixed return-on-assets.  
We also referred in our analysis to “current trends in the 
evolution of transmission tariffs”. In this case, the annual 
4. More details regarding the calculations made can be found in the cor-
responding article.
growth of tariffs is limited to the average increase in the 
ENTSO-E area over the last 3 years, i.e. CPI+1.04%.
3. Results 
3.1 Results in the BAU scenario
Under the financing strategy applied in our business-as-
usual (BAU) scenario, there is no injection of external eq-
uity into the TSO, and the pay-out ratio is equal to 70%. 
Our results indicate that there is a clear financeability issue: 
with a financing strategy purely based on debt emission, and 
with a rise in tariffs limited to current trends, both invest-
ment scenarios would lead to a severe degradation of the 
TSO financial status. If an investment-grade were to be 
maintained under the current trend in tariffs, it would 
Box 2: Estimation of the required capital expenditures over 2012-2030
Each of our scenario features a scenario for new developments, as well as a scenario for infrastructure renewal.
Two alternative scenarios for investments related to new projects
The first scenario (‘Extended TYNDP’) was based on the ten-year network development plan published by ENTSO-E for the 
period 2012-2021. We extended this scenario by considering investments needs would follow the same trend until 2030. The total 
volume of investment by 2030 would amount to € 207 billion.
The second scenario (‘EC roadmap’) was based on the Impact Assessment of the Energy Roadmap 2050 published by the European 
Commission in 2011 and featured investment needs equal to € 155 billion by 2030.
One complementary scenario for infrastructure renewal
A major share of the existing infrastructure will have to be replaced in the coming decades. We used the results of calculations 
realised by the IEA in its World Energy Outlook 2011, and subtracted savings realised thanks to investment in new projects. The 
resulting need for investment would amount to €55 billion by 2030. 
Annual investment costs in the ENTSO-E area over the period 2012-2030 (€2012 Billion) 
New developments Renewal costs
4Policy Brief 2013/03
Florence School of Regulation
only be possible for the TSO to develop 47% of the new 
investments planned in the TYNDP scenario, and 61% of 
the EC Roadmap scenario. 
We estimated the increase in tariffs required to ensure 
the financeability of 100% of our first investment sce-
nario (extended TYNDP) to be equal to an annual rate of 
CPI+3.4%, roughly three times the trend observed in the 
past years. Similarly, ensuring financeability of our second 
investment scenario (EC Roadmap) would require an an-
nual increase in tariffs equal to CPI+2.1%. 
Note that the two most important sources of increase would 
be depreciation and interests payments, with rise of divi-
dends only accounting for a minor share of the total increase. 
3.2 Alternative financing strategies
We then studied the impact of two alternative financing 
strategies to achieve a higher share of the investment pro-
gram while keeping tariffs at a lower level.
In the “Issue additional equity” scenario, the high dividend 
pay-out ratio is maintained but the TSOs issue additional 
equity (instead of debt) to finance capital expenditures. 
In the “Shift to growth model” scenario, the dividend pay-
out ratio is lowered and TSOs retain earnings in order to 
finance capital expenditures internally. Shareholders do not 
receive their return as cash but from holding the share for a 
while and selling it at a higher value. 
By increasing the equity share (whether internally or exter-
nally), it is possible to finance a larger share of investments 
program while conserving an investment-grade. Yet, as the 
costs of interests on debt are fixed and lower than the costs 
of equity, injecting further equity while maintaining tariffs 
at the same level will result mechanically in reducing the 
ROE. The extent to which external sources of equity can 
be used to finance large-scale investments without in-
creasing tariffs is therefore limited. 
However, by injecting a small share of external equity, or 
retaining a slightly higher share of the earnings, it is pos-
sible to achieve the whole scale of the investment program 
while conserving the same return on equity and reducing 
the needed increase in tariffs. 
In the case of external equity injection, the optimum is 
reached for relatively small level of equity injections, as illus-
trated in Figure 1. In order to achieve a 8% post-tax nomi-
nal ROE, the minimum annual increase in tariffs is obtained 
for equity injections equal to 8% of financing needs, which 
amount to €10 billion over the time period 2012-2030. In 
order to achieve a 10% post-tax nominal ROE, the mini-
mum annual increase in tariffs is obtained for equity injec-
tions equal to 4% of financing needs, which amount to €5 
billion over the time period 2012-2030.
Similar results can be obtained for the shift to growth model 
strategy. In order to achieve a ROE equal to 8%, the opti-
mum is found for a dividends pay-out ratio equal to 55%. In 
order to achieve a ROE equal to 10%, the optimum is found 
for a dividends pay-out ratio equal to 65%. 
Note that in any case, a significant rise in tariffs would still 
be required to achieve the whole scale of the investment 
programs.
Figure 1: Average annual increase in tariffs required over the period 2012-2030 to achieve a given average ROE while con-
serving investment grade for different financing strategies in the ‘Extended TYNDP’ scenario
Higher equity injection Lower dividend pay-out ratio
Equity share in new investments Dividend Pay-out ratio
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4. Policy implications
In this article we looked at the issue of financeability of 
investments in the transmission network with a different 
angle from existing works. More traditional issues include 
identifying and allocating costs and benefits, delivering ad-
equate incentives to TSOs, or getting access to debt at rea-
sonable costs. Our analysis revealed that in addition, even if 
all these challenges were solved, there could still be limits 
on TSOs’ ability to meet the need for investments. 
Pure debt financing will lead to a threat that the volume 
of the debt might become too important for TSOs to face 
repayments. This situation is reflected in the degradation 
of key financial metrics. It means that TSOs’ ability to meet 
their obligations would then be vulnerable to small pertur-
bations of the allowed rate-of-return. Financing institu-
tions will only accept such a situation if the regulatory 
frame is very stable and if returns are guaranteed in the 
long-term. Rules put into place should in particular mini-
mise the eventuality of a regulatory hold-up. 
Besides, according to our results, the business-as-usual fi-
nancing strategy of TSO will not be the most adequate 
strategy to finance a significant wave of investments. Con-
sequential savings could be achieved by resorting to alter-
native financing strategies. The implementation of these 
strategies will require an evolution of the perception of 
TSOs owners (mainly public entities), for instance opening 
TSOs to external sources of equity, and to new kind of inves-
tors attracted by growth entities. 
In any case, an increase in investment will lead to a sig-
nificant increase of costs, mostly to cover depreciation 
and interest payments. Transmission tariffs only constitute 
a small share of the total costs of electricity for consumers, 
but a three-fold increase of their annual growth might nev-
ertheless generate protests. It is important not to sacrifice 
significant benefits in the long-term to limit spending in the 
short-term. Similarly, it is key to make sure that the need for 
important sources of financing is perceived as being associ-
ated to real needs and not a result of bad management and 
costs getting out-of control.
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